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Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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Alexander, Corinne E.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.. |
Agency theory explanations for agricultural contract designs are often observationally equivalent to perfect information explanations. Further in order to test properly the hypothesis that moral hazard is important one must first test and accept the hypothesis that agents respond to contract incentives. If agents do not respond to contract incentives then it is unlikely that moral hazard is significant. Accordingly we move beyond contract design and focus on whether or not we can reject the hypothesis that moral hazard is important by examining growers responses to price incentives for processing tomato quality. We utilize a natural experiment. In our data set growers deliver processing tomatoes under a price incentives contract and for a fixed price per... |
Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123595 |
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Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge; Alexander, Corinne E.; Goodhue, Rachael E.. |
Controversy over the use of genetically engineered (GE) crops may have induced some farmers to disadopt these seeds, making a traditional diffusion model inappropriate. In this study, we develop and estimate a dynamic diffusion model, examine the diffusion paths of GE corn, soybeans, and cotton, predict the adoption of those crops over the next two years, and explore the main determinants of the diffusion rate. Our estimates indicate that future growth of Bt crops will be slower or negative, depending mainly on the infestation levels of the target pests. Adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans and cotton will continue to increase, unless consumer sentiment in the United States changes radically. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31479 |
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Carter, Colin A.; Chalfant, James A.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Groves, Kiara; Simon, Leo K.. |
Environmental regulation of agriculture is becoming increasingly important, and growers are increasingly concerned about the effects of regulations on their profitability. Regulations governing the use of a pesticide affect its economic value. Further, growers often face a choice among pesticide alternatives, each with its own set of regulatory restrictions. In this environment, the introduction of a new regulation can have complex effects on growers' profit-maximizing pesticide choices. Buffer zones and regional emissions caps mean that pesticide choices can have important spatial components. Our paper presents an optimization model that incorporates spatial considerations at the field and regional level. We apply our model to fumigant choice by... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20166 |
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Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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